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I. Introduction 
Unlike the invention of a new technology, which often appears to occur as a single event 
or jump, the diffusion of that technology usually appears as a continuous and rather slow 
process. Yet it is diffusion rather than invention or innovation that ultimately determines 
the pace of economic growth and the rate of change of productivity. Until many users 
adopt a new technology, it may contribute little to our well-being. As Nathan Rosenberg 
said in 1972,  
“in the history of diffusion of many innovations, one cannot help being 
struck by two characteristics of the diffusion process: its apparent overall 
slowness on the one hand, and the wide variations in the rates of 
acceptance of different inventions, on the other.”  
Thus understanding the workings of the diffusion process is essential to understanding 
how technological change actually comes about and why it may be slow at times.   
Diffusion can be seen as the cumulative or aggregate result of a series of individual 
calculations that weigh the incremental benefits of adopting a new technology against the 
costs of change, often in an environment characterized by uncertainty (as to the future 
evolution of the technology and its benefits) and by limited information (about both the 
benefits and costs and even about the very existence of the technology). Although the 
ultimate decision is made on the demand side, the benefits and costs can be influenced by 
decisions made by suppliers of the new technology. The resulting diffusion rate is then 
determined by summing over these individual decisions. 
The most important thing to observe about this kind of decision is that at any point in 
time the choice being made is not a choice between adopting and not adopting but a 
choice between adopting now or deferring the decision until later. The reason it is 
important to look at the decision in this way is because of the nature of the benefits and 
costs. By and large, the benefits from adopting a new technology, as in the wireless 
communications example, are flow benefits which are received throughout the life of the 
acquired innovation. However, the costs, especially those of the non-pecuniary “learning” 
type, are typically incurred at the time of adoption and cannot be recovered. There may 
be an ongoing fee for using some types of new technology, but typically it is much less 
than the full initial cost. That is, ex ante, a potential adopter weighs the fixed costs of 
adoption against the benefits he expects, but ex post, these fixed costs are irrelevant 
because a great part of them have been sunk and cannot be recovered.  New Economy Handbook: Hall and Khan    April 2003 
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This argument in turn implies two stylized facts about the adoption of new technologies: 
first, adoption is usually an absorbing state, in the sense that we rarely observe a new 
technology being abandoned in favor of an old one. This is because the decision to adopt 
faces a large benefit minus cost hurdle; once this hurdle is passed, the costs are sunk and 
the decision to abandon requires giving up the benefit without regaining the cost. Second, 
under uncertainty about the benefits of the new technology, there is an option value to 
waiting before sinking the costs of adoption, which may tend to delay adoption.  
II.  Modeling diffusion  
Many observers in the past have pointed to the fact that when the number of users of a 
new product or invention is plotted versus time, the resulting curve is typically an S-
shaped or ogive distribution. For example, this feature of the process was noted both by 
Zvi Griliches in his seminal study of the economic determinants of the diffusion of hybrid 
corn in 1957 and by Edwin Mansfield in his no less important work on the diffusion of 
major innovations in the coal, iron and steel, brewing, and railroad industries. It seems 
natural to imagine adoption proceeding slowly at first, accelerating as it spreads 
throughout the potential adopters, and then slowing down as the relevant population 
becomes saturated. Figure 1 illustrates the adoption patterns in the United States for a 
variety of twentieth century innovations. The heterogeneity remarked on by Rosenberg is 
clearly apparent: compare the diffusion of washing machines in U.S. households with that 
of Video Cassette Recorders (VCRs). 
The S-shape is a natural implication of the observation that adoption is usually an 
absorbing state. For example, a unimodal distribution for the time of adoption that has a 
mean and variance, i.e., finite first and second moments, will yield this type of 
cumulative curve. In terms of benefits and costs, a variety of simple assumptions will 
generate an S-curve for diffusion. The two leading models explain the dispersion in 
adoption times using two different mechanisms: adopter heterogeneity, or adopter 
learning.  
The heterogeneity model assumes that different individuals place different values on the 
innovation. The following set of assumptions will generate an S-curve for adoption: 1) 
The distribution of values placed on the new product by potential adopters is normal (or 
approximately normal); 2) the cost of the new product is constant or declines 
monotonically over time; 3) individuals adopt when the valuation they have for the 
product is greater than the cost of the product.  
An important alternative model is a learning or epidemic model, which is widely used in 
the marketing and sociological literature on diffusion (see Strang and Soule in the further 
reading section for a survey of some of this literature). In this model, consumers can have 
identical tastes and the cost of the new technology can be constant over time, but not all 
consumers are informed about the new technology at the same time. Because each 
consumer learns about the technology from his or her neighbor, as time passes, more and 
more people adopt the technology during any period, leading to an increasing rate of 
adoption. However, eventually the market becomes saturated, and the rate decreases 
again. This too will generate an S-shaped curve for the diffusion rate.
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combining this model with the previous model simply reinforces the S-shape of the 
curve.  
Models of the type just described have been the workhorses of diffusion research and 
have been very successful in describing the data we see. Researchers such as Griliches 
and Mansfield have frequently approached the problem of data analysis by characterizing 
a variety of diffusion curves observed for different innovations by means of two or three 
parameters and then relating these parameters to the economic characteristics of the 
particular innovation or adopter. The virtue of this approach is its simplicity and 
transparency, as well as ability to capture the main features of the process. 
However, recently a newer line of research has been opened up by economists such as 
Paul Stoneman that incorporates the idea that adopting a new technology is similar to (if 
not the same as) any other kind of investment under uncertainty and therefore can be 
analyzed in the real options framework suggested by Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck 
in their 1994 book. As in the case of the investment decision, the adoption of new 
technology is characterized by 1) uncertainty over future profit streams, 2) irreversibility 
that creates at least some sunk costs, and 3) the opportunity to delay. The advantage of 
the real options modeling approach is that it can explicitly incorporate these features into 
the adopter’s decision-making process. In a real options model, the potential adopter is 
viewed as having a call option to adopt the new technology that can be exercised at any 
time. The primary implication of this way of looking at the problem is that there is 
“option value” to waiting: that is, adoption should not take place the instant that benefits 
equal costs, but should be delayed until benefits are somewhat above costs (that is, one 
invests when the option is “deep in the money”), thus providing yet another reason why 
diffusion may be rather slow. In a thesis written in 1998, Adela Luque applied this idea to 
a study the adoption of new manufacturing technology such as CAD/CAM and robotics 
in U.S. manufacturing plants, finding that proxies for uncertainty did indeed help predict 
adoption of these technologies. 
At this point the question which concerns both economists and those interested in 
encouraging the spread of new technologies is the question of what factors affect the rates 
at which these events occur. A second and no less interesting question is what are the 
determinants of the ceiling at which the S-curve asymptotes. That is, when would we 
expect this ceiling to be less than one hundred percent of the potential user base?  The 
next three sections of this article review some of these factors, dividing them into three 
groups: those that influence the demand for adoption, those that influence the supply 
characteristics of the new technology, and the characteristics of the environment in which 
the adoption decision takes place.  
III. Demand  determinants 
The obvious determinants of new technology adoption are the benefits received by the 
user and the costs of adoption. In many cases these benefits are simply the difference in 
profits when a firm shifts from an older technology to a newer. In the case of consumers, 
of course, the benefits are the increased utility from the new good, but may also include 
such “non-economic” factors as the enjoyment of being the first on the block with a new New Economy Handbook: Hall and Khan    April 2003 
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good. However, students of the diffusion of technology have highlighted other less 
obvious factors that may be no less important in the determination of the demand for new 
technologies. These are the availability of complementary skills and inputs, the strength 
of the relation to the firm’s customers, and the importance of network effects.  
Skill level of workers and state of capital goods sector  
As Nathan Rosenberg argued in his 1972 article, the skill level of workers and the state of 
the capital goods sector are two of the important determinants of diffusion of a 
technology to individual firms, because both workers and capital goods are crucial for 
successful implementation and operation of a new invention. If a successful 
implementation of a technology requires complex new skills, and if it is time-consuming 
or costly to acquire the required level of competence, then adoption might be slow. As a 
consequence, the overall level of skills available to the enterprise as well as the manner in 
which the necessary skills are acquired are important determinants of diffusion. 
Rosenberg also stresses the importance of the technical capacity of an industry for 
adoption. The state of the supplying capital goods sector is an important determinant of 
diffusion because the initial conceptualization of an invention needs the appropriate 
technical capacities and skills to make it commercially viable. If the initial idea is too 
advanced relative to the engineering capacity of the industry then it will take longer for 
the idea to be implemented. Recent empirical evidence confirms the importance of both 
these factors in the diffusion of computing technology around the world. 
For example, Francesco Caselli and Wilbur Coleman II (2001) looked at computer 
adoption in a large number of OECD countries during the period 1970 to 1990. They 
found that worker aptitude (measured as educational level), the openness to 
manufacturing trade, and the overall investment rate in the country are among the 
important determinants of the level of investment in computers. The results provide 
support for Rosenberg’s argument, since high levels of education are associated with high 
levels of skill, and high rates of investment lead to a highly developed and sophisticated 
capital goods sector. As the authors point out, trade openness is significant not because 
computers comprise a large share of manufacturing imports; in fact computers are usually 
a small fraction of total manufacturing imports. Trade openness here refers to a learning 
effect -- high technology imports from developed countries are generally coupled with a 
high level of knowledge transfer and this knowledge spillover in turn enhances adoption 
of computer technology.  
At the household level within the United States, Kennickell and Kwast (1997) also find 
evidence for the role of education, consumer skills and learning in their study of the 
consumer adoption of electronic banking. 70% of all American households used some 
form of electronic banking in 1995, but only a small fraction of households used the more 
recent and advanced forms of electronic banking such as bill paying. The most common 
use of electronic banking was for making direct deposits, which is a relatively well-
established and old technology, one that is widely used throughout the world, indirectly 
confirming the existence of a learning effect. As a technology develops and improves 
more people become familiar with it and comfortable about using it, and this accelerates 
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Customer commitment and relationships 
A stable and secure customer base is an important factor for technology adoption in some 
industries. In order to recoup costly investments in new production technologies, firms 
want to be assured that there will be income in the future to pay for the investment, as a 
way of reducing the risk inherent in the adoption decision. Susan Helper provided 
evidence in 1995 on this factor in her study of adoption of computer numerically 
controlled (CNC) machine tools in the auto component supply industry in the United 
States. A CNC machine is different from a regular machine in the sense that it does not 
have to be controlled manually by an operator; it can be programmed to be run by a 
computer and thus can significantly increase productivity and product quality. Helper 
tested for the impact of three factors that are likely to affect the adoption of a CNC 
machine tool -- expected efficiency gain (defined as a reduction in operating cost), 
market power of the firm (proxied by market share), and the stability of the firm’s 
relationship with its customers, which guarantees the presence of future demand. 
According to her results, the relationship with customers is so important in the 
automotive industry that firms which would have a significant increase in efficiency but 
do not have a stable customer base adopt a CNC machine in fewer than 50 percent of the 
cases.  
Adoption of a new technology is often very costly for various reasons --- new machines 
need to be purchased and often the technology, as in the case of a CNC machine, is a 
specific asset; employees need to be trained to operate the new technology; if there are 
network effects then complementary machines need to be updated or replaced; if 
operation needs to be shut down for installation there will be a cost from lost output. In a 
world where demand is uncertain, firms are likely to be unsure about whether or not they 
can recoup the cost of adopting the new technology, or how long it may take to recover 
the cost. As a result, it might not be worthwhile for them to adopt even if the technology 
has the potential of improving productivity or product quality. In the presence of 
customer commitment, however, firms can more accurately predict the demand for their 
product and the profit from production, and this gives them incentives to adopt a 
technology if it is profitable for them to do so. Helper, in her paper, proxies for customer 
commitment by the length of contract between the automotive supplier and their 
customer, and argues that customer commitment is important both directly and indirectly 
through its interaction with market share. It directly affects adoption by providing 
suppliers guaranteed demand that is ensured by contracts. It indirectly affects adoption 
through market power since customers in a highly concentrated market do not have many 
alternative sources of supply and as a result customers tend to stay with the firm. 
In 1998, Thomas Hubbard studied the adoption of on-board information technology (IT) 
by firms in the trucking industry and also found evidence of the importance of the 
customer relationship in adoption. Because truck deliveries are scattered and spread out 
geographically, it is very difficult for firms in the trucking industry to coordinate dispatch 
and monitor the drivers. By improving the quality of information available to firms, on-
board IT can facilitate these management problems. Hubbard analyzes two types of on-
board IT devices in his paper: trip recorders and electronic vehicle management systems 
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other things, the speed of the truck, how long the truck was inactive, and when the truck 
was turned on and off. The data from the trip-recorder, however, is only available when 
the truck returns to its base. Therefore, it does not assist in coordination of hauls. EVMS 
provides the same data plus information on the truck’s geographic location. In addition, it 
can relay the data to the base thorough a satellite or land link, and allows real-time data 
and voice communication between the driver and a dispatcher. Thus an EVMS helps in 
both coordinating dispatch and improving drivers’ incentives. 
Hubbard found that transactional relationships between the trucking firm and the shipper 
determine the effectiveness and therefore the adoption of on-board IT. As expected, on-
board IT is more valuable for firms if deliveries are time-sensitive, and if truckers operate 
far from the base and do not return at the end of the day. But in addition the nature of 
relationship with customers determines whether the benefits are coordination-related or 
incentive-related. If the customer relation is stable, either through a contract or vertical 
integration, then on-board IT in the form of a trip recorder helps more with the 
monitoring task. However, if the transactional relationship is not governed by a contract 
and takes place in a spot market, then the benefits are more coordination-related and 
EVMS is more likely to be adopted.  
Network effects  
In today’s economy, network effects due to technology standards are very important 
because there is a high degree of interrelation among technologies. A technology has a 
network effect when the value of the technology to a user increases with the number of 
total users in the network. Network effects in adoption can arise from two different but 
related reasons, often characterized as direct and indirect. Direct network effects are 
present when a user’s utility from using a technology directly increases with the total size 
of the network. For example, the utility that a user gets from using electronic mail 
directly depends on how many other people are accessible by electronic mail. Similarly, 
the benefit from having a telephone also directly depends on the number of telephone sets 
in the network since the benefit will increase as more people can be reached by the 
phone.  
Indirect network effects also arise from increased utility due to larger network size, but in 
this case the increase in utility comes from the wider availability of a complementary 
good. For example, a user’s utility from purchasing a DVD player may be increasing with 
the total sales of DVD players, since the availability of appropriate software will increase 
as more DVD players are sold. This is often called the “hardware-software” example, 
where the availability of software increases as more hardware is sold because of the 
complementarity between the hardware and the software. Similarly, network effects may 
also be present in the case of durable goods where beliefs about post-purchase service 
may depend on the total number of sales, and therefore consumers will prefer to purchase 
from a firm that is older or more popular.  
It is clear that network effects are likely to significantly impact technology adoption since 
they affect the expected benefit from a new technology. Most empirical work in this area 
has confirmed this fact. In 1995, Garth Saloner and Andrea Shepard found evidence for 
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machines, the network effect emerges in the following way: if ATM’s are largely 
available over geographically dispersed areas, the benefit from using an ATM will 
increase since customers will be able to access their bank accounts from any geographic 
location they want. This implies that the value of an ATM network increases with the 
number of available ATM locations, and the value of a bank’s network to a customer will 
be determined in part by the final network size of the bank. As a result, assuming that a 
bank can extract part of the consumer surplus, a bank will adopt ATM more rapidly if it 
expects to have a larger number of ATM locations in equilibrium, which implies that its 
network will have more value for its consumers.  
Using data for United States commercial banks for the period 1971 to 1979, Saloner and 
Shepard estimated a duration model of adoption, that is, a model for the probability that a 
bank will install an ATM network in a given year conditional on bank characteristics and 
the fact that it has not yet installed a network. They use the number of branches possessed 
by a bank as a proxy for its expected ATM network size in equilibrium, since banks 
generally installed ATM machines in their branches during the sample period. They find 
that banks adopt sooner the more branches they have and the larger the value of the 
deposits from their customers, and interpret this result as evidence of network effects in 
ATM adoption. 
Studies on the telecommunications industry have found similar evidence. In 1998, Sumit 
Majumdar and S. Vankataraman looked at the adoption of electronic switching 
technology by telecommunications firms. Firms in the United States telecommunications 
industry began converting from electromechanical switching technology to electronic 
switching technology in the 1970s because the latter offers significantly more efficient 
and improved services than the former technology. Electronic switching technology 
increases operating efficiency, reduces cost, and also enables firms to offer new services 
that electromechanical switches cannot. As a result, even though electronic switches are 
compatible with electromechanical switches, firms have incentives to adopt electronic 
switches in order to improve overall efficiency and customer satisfaction. The authors use 
data from the forty largest United States firms for the years 1973, 1978, 1981, 1984 and 
1987. Like Saloner and Shepard, they find that the network effect and economies of scale 
in production both significantly impact the adoption decisions of firms.  
However, their results have a dynamic component in the sense that the two factors, 
economies of scale and network effects, do not always influence adoption decisions 
simultaneously. The authors find that production economies of scale are more important 
during the earlier years and this scale effect weakens over time. Network effects, on the 
other hand, are important during all phases of the technology adoption. The authors use 
two proxies for size or scale: the total miles of wires owned by each company indicating 
the amount of coverage of each company, and a firm’s share of the total switches in its 
operating area indicating its share of installed base. The network effect here results from 
the density of consumers --- a user’s utility from being on the network is an increasing 
function of the total number of users in the network. This is because a consumer can 
increasingly use the variety of services provided by the new technology as the total 
number and variety of other users increase. The authors use two proxies for the density 
and variety of user population: the share of urban population in the state indicating the 
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indicating consumer variety. Like most technologies, the adoption of electronic switches 
involves large upfront costs, and with time and practice it becomes more efficient for 
firms to adopt. Therefore, the scale effect is much less important in the later period of 
adoption after firms have become more efficient. However, the network effect is always 
present.   
The diffusion of “general purpose technologies” has been argued to be particularly 
subject to network effects. Examples of these technologies include electricity and 
information technology. Authors like Paul David have pointed out that the slow 
introduction of the electric dynamo into factory use was due to the need to re-organize 
the operation of the entire manufacturing facility to make effective use of this innovation 
and drawn a parallel between this episode in the history of technological diffusion and the 
one in which we currently find ourselves with the internet and information technology 
more broadly. In a series of empirical studies on the diffusion of computers in U.S. firms, 
Eric Brynjolfsson and Loren Hitt have concluded that a similar argument applies to the 
use of IT and consequent reorganization of a firm’s method of doing business.  
IV. Supply  behavior 
In his influential 1972 article cited earlier, Nathan Rosenberg argued strongly that one of 
the reasons for the slow but eventually complete diffusion of new technologies was their 
relatively poor performance in their initial incarnations. That is, the behavior of the 
suppliers of these new technologies both in improving them and in lowering their cost 
over time was essential in ensuring their eventual acceptance. He identified several 
factors that are important on the supply side: the improvements made to the technology 
after its introduction, the invention of new uses for the technology (consider, for example, 
laser technology), and the development of complementary inputs such as user skills and 
other capital goods. He also pointed to the role of induced improvements in older 
competing technologies in retarding the shift to newer technologies. 
Improvements in the new technology 
  If a new technology is imperfect in its early stage, then the subsequent rate of 
improvement is an important determinant of adoption of the technology. This results 
from the fact that the efficiency gain from the new technology is much larger during its 
enhancement stage than during the initial stage. In some cases, improvement in the 
technology includes the development of machines to manufacture the new innovation. 
History is full of examples where inventions were conceived but manufacturing 
capabilities were completely unequal to making them concrete (for example, the 
machines of Leonardo da Vinci and Charles Babbage).  
A leading contemporary example is the development of methods for the manufacture of 
high density semiconductor chips in parallel with the improvement in the chips 
themselves. The performance gains implied by Moore’s law could only have been 
achieved via improved semiconductor photolithography equipment and improvements in 
the materials used for manufacture of the chips.  New Economy Handbook: Hall and Khan    April 2003 
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Improvements in the old technology 
A second observation made by Rosenberg about the diffusion of technology concerns the 
behavior of substitute older technologies. Sometimes when a new innovation is a close 
substitute for an existing technology, then the innovation itself may induce providers of 
the old technology to make improvements or engage in other types of competitive 
behavior in an effort to retain their market position. This in turn will slow the diffusion of 
the new technology.  
Complementary inputs 
The importance of complementary inputs in the diffusion of new technology cannot be 
overemphasized. As discussed in section III, the presence of skilled labor and the 
necessary capital in a firm increases its ability to absorb and make use of a new 
innovation. But this itself can be greatly facilitated by the supplying firm. For example, it 
is common for the producers of new technologies to offer various training courses in their 
use. In some cases we observe hardware manufacturers such as the makers of mobile 
telephones or PDAs teaming up with software suppliers like Microsoft to produce the 
software that will encourage customers to purchase their new telephones.  
One piece of evidence on the importance of complementary inputs comes from the 
mobile telecommunications industry. In mobile telecommunication, spectrum capacity is 
the critical resource needed for radio transmission between a user’s mobile equipment 
and the base station for the user’s area. The transition from analog to digital technology 
drastically increased effective spectrum capacity and thus reduced capacity constraints 
and improved the quality and quantity of radio transmissions. In a study done in 2001, 
Harald Gruber and Frank Verboven found that this factor (the improvement in spectrum 
use) was more important than pricing in diffusing mobile telephony in Europe during the 
1990s.   
V.  Environmental and institutional factors  
Market structure and firm size 
At least since the work of Joseph Schumpeter and certainly since Kenneth Arrow’s 
influential paper of 1962 on the incentives for innovative activity, the economic literature 
on diffusion has debated the role of market structure in innovation and diffusion. Market 
power has been argued to both encourage and discourage the diffusion process. As Nancy 
Dorfman suggested in 1987, four major arguments support the positive role of firm size 
and market share in determining the level of innovative activity and these same 
arguments apply also to the choice to use new innovations, because many of the factors 
and underlying issues are quite similar at both stages.  
The first two arguments are due to Schumpeter: firms that are large or have large market 
shares are more likely to undertake innovation, both because appropriability (the benefits 
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  10
funds (the costs of new technology adoption) to these firms is greater. Firms with larger 
market share are more likely to adopt a new technology because they have a greater 
ability to appropriate the profits from the adoption. Use or innovation of a new 
technology often involves huge upfront costs, for example, investment in production, 
training of workers, marketing, and research and development. A firm will have an 
incentive to invest in a new technology only if it can later obtain profits that justify the 
initial investment. Since profits erode in the presence of competition, only firms with 
sufficient market power would find it profitable to adopt. 
The second Schumpeterian argument involves the availability of resources needed for 
investment in a new technology. In the presence of imperfect capital markets, due in part 
to asymmetric information problems between investors and firms, larger and more 
profitable firms are more likely to have the financial resources required for purchasing 
and installing a new technology. In addition, they may be better able to attract the 
necessary human capital and other resources that are necessary.  
The third argument is related to the potential risks associated with the use, development, 
and marketing of a new technology. Clearly, uncertainty about the benefits of a new 
technology is one of the factors slowing down the speed of diffusion. Firms with large 
market share are sometimes better able to spread the potential risks associated with new 
projects because they are able to be more diversified in their technology choice and are in 
a position to try out a new technology while keeping the old one operating at the same 
time in case of unexpected problems.  
Finally, the fourth argument is that many new technologies are scale-enhancing, and 
therefore larger firms adopt them sooner because they capture economies of scale from 
production via the learning curve more quickly and can spread the other fixed costs 
associated with adoption across a larger number of units.  
However, large size and market power may also slow down the rate of diffusion. First, 
larger firms may have multiple levels of bureaucracy and this can impede decision-
making processes about new ideas and projects, and the hiring of new workers. Second, it 
may be relatively more expensive for older and larger firms to adopt a new technology 
because they have many resources and human capital sunk in the old technology and its 
architecture, as was argued by Rebecca Henderson and Kim Clark in 1990. In the 
presence of networks, this problem may be worse since it may be a very expensive 
undertaking to convert the entire network to the new technology.  
Empirical evidence on some of these factors is fairly clear. In 1984, Timothy Hannan and 
John McDowell found that market concentration, bank size, whether or not the bank is 
owned by a holding company, and market conditions like prevailing wage levels all 
significantly affected the adoption of Automated Teller Machine (ATM) by U.S. banks 
during the period 1971-1979. In addition to the positive size and concentration effects, 
the higher probability for holding company banks is probably due to the reduced level of 
risk associated with being part of a larger organization.  
The results also show that the adoption decision is highly correlated with the prevailing 
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financial transactions, the higher the wage rate, the more profitable is the adoption of a 
labor-saving technology. In addition, higher prevailing wages may also imply a high level 
of educational attainment and skills among people in that market, and that people have a 
high-valuation for their time. In both cases, a new and time-saving technology like ATM 
would be highly desirable among customers.  
Similar evidence was provided in the ATM adoption study by Garth Saloner and Andrea 
Shepard cited earlier. In addition to the network effect, they found that banks with larger 
deposits value in total adopted sooner. Presumably this is due to economies of scale in 
adopting the new technology. As the number of customers increase, the average fixed 
cost of providing services per customer, including costs associated with ATM 
installations, decline, and this reduction in cost in turn encourages banks to adopt more 
rapidly. 
The market structure of the sector supplying the new innovation also has an impact on its 
adoption via the effect of market structure on adoption. In the case of mobile telephony, 
this has been shown by two different sets of authors, using data on two different regions, 
the European Union and the United States.  
In the study of mobile telephone adoption in the European Union referred to earlier, 
Harald Gruber and Frank Verboven explained variations in the rapid diffusion of mobile 
telecommunications in Europe using two factors: the market structure of mobile phone 
providers, and the improvements in mobile telephony technology achieved by the 
transition from analog to digital technology. Although the impact of technological 
improvements was the most important factor, they also found that the concentration of 
mobile telephone suppliers was negatively correlated with consumer adoption of mobile 
phones providing support for the idea that competition increases adoption by lowering 
prices.  
Philip Parker and Lars-Hendrik Röller found similar evidence for the diffusion of mobile 
telecommunications in the United States during the 1984 to 1988 period. Using a 
structural model of market conduct in this industry, they showed that prices were lower in 
duopoly markets than in monopoly markets, and even lower in non-cooperative duopoly 
markets than in cooperative duopoly markets, thus encouraging adoption.  
Government and regulation 
The regulatory environment and governmental institutions more generally can have a 
powerful effect on technology adoption, often via the ability of a government to 
“sponsor” a technology with network effects. Economic regulation has effects similar to 
the market structure/size effects discussed earlier, in that the effect of regulation is often 
to foreclose entry and grant fairly large market shares to incumbents, reducing incentives 
for cost-reducing innovation but also in many cases increasing the benefits from 
innovation due to the small number of firms in the market. The exact effects observed 
will depend partly on the particular price-setting mechanisms chosen by the regulator.  
Several empirical studies in the healthcare sector have highlighted the role of regulation 
in this sector on diffusion. In 2001, Laurence Baker studied the effects of the provision of New Economy Handbook: Hall and Khan    April 2003 
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health insurance on the adoption of new medical procedures. He argues that by providing 
reimbursement for the use of advanced and costly procedures, a generous insurance 
system often fosters adoption of new techniques and methods of treatment. Managed care 
organizations, on the other hand, are generally known to strictly monitor the use of 
advanced procedures in order to reduce cost, and so might be thought of as an 
impediment in the diffusion path of new innovations.  
To test this idea, Baker estimated the impact of HMO market share on adoption of MRI 
technology and finds that increasing HMO market share significantly reduced the 
probability that a hospital adopted MRI technology, even after controlling for state-level 
variations by including state fixed effects, and for unobserved heterogeneity by including 
indicators for whether or not the hospital adopted technologies that were invented before 
MRI. However, he found a much smaller impact of managed care on MRI adoption by 
non-hospital health care providers, such as physicians’ offices and other outpatient 
facilities. Baker argues that this may be because managed care organizations encourage 
the use of outpatient facilities in order to reduce cost and thus directly increase the 
demand for MRI technology by increasing the demand for outpatient services.  
In a 1996 study, David Cutler and Mark McClellan also found evidence for the positive 
effect of a generous insurance environment on adoption decisions. They studied the use 
of an advanced heart attack treatment procedure called angioplasty during the period 
1984 to 1991, finding that the insurance environment, along with state regulations related 
to the use of new medical technology, and the interactions between physicians and 
hospitals, are the most important factors determining the use of angioplasty. Unlike the 
study by Baker, which looks at the impact of HMO market share on adoption, this study 
analyzes the impact of the general insurance climate on adoption. Three variables are 
used as proxies for insurance environment: share of population that is uninsured, share of 
population that belongs to HMOs, and an indicator for whether or not the state regulated 
payments made to the hospital. The first two variables reflect the overall insurance 
atmosphere whereas the third variable reflects stringency of state regulation about 
insurance payments. Significance of all these variables indicates that adoption is affected 
by the general insurance climate in addition to the generosity of the reimbursement 
system.  
Adoption of new technology is impacted not only by regulations about market structure 
or the insurance environment, but also by other types of regulations, such as 
environmental regulation. Environmental regulations directly affect adoption because in 
many industries regulations will either prohibit or require the use of certain technology or 
production methods. For example, Wayne Gray and Ronald Shadbegian found that 
changes in U.S. environmental regulations during the 1970s and 1980s affected the 
technology choice of firms in the paper and pulp industry. Before the 1970’s, regulations 
were established and enforced by state and local government, and enforcement was not 
very strict. The federal government was not much involved in the regulatory process. 
This changed with the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 
the early 1970’s and the federal government began taking the primary role in setting and 
enforcing environmental regulations with much stricter enforcement policies.  New Economy Handbook: Hall and Khan    April 2003 
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Gray and Shadbegian use this regulatory shift to estimate the effect of regulation on 
investment strategies of firms in the paper industry, where environmental regulations 
could have encouraged adoption of new production technology if they required 
replacement of older, more pollution-creating machines or methods. However, they might 
also have reduced overall investment and therefore the diffusion of new innovations if it 
was costly for firms to purchase pollution abatement technologies or remodel older 
plants. Using annual data from 1972 to 1990, Gray and Shadbegian find that firms indeed 
respond to the policy environment they function in. First, they find that plant age is 
inversely related to the pollution generating level of the technology used, i.e., newer 
plants are more likely to use technologies that produce less pollution. Second, they find 
that new plants in stricter regulatory environments are more likely to use technologies 
that produce less pollution. Third, they show that regulation-driven investment and 
productive investment crowd each other out, i.e., more investment in pollution-abating 
technologies has led to a decline in investment in production technology.  
David Mowery and Nathan Rosenberg have argued in a 1981 study that rapid diffusion of 
technological innovations in the U. S. commercial aircraft industry to U. S. airlines 
during the mid-twentieth century was due in part to actions of the regulatory agencies, 
first the Post Office and then the Civil Aeronautics Board. Because price competition was 
limited during the CAB period, airlines focused on the rapid adoption of new types of 
aircraft in an effort to compete on quality. Also, because long haul point-to-point service 
was encouraged relative to short haul, innovation and diffusion in the United States 
tended to involve larger aircraft (more than 60 seats).  
VI. Concluding  thoughts 
This review of the adoption of new technologies has focused to a great extent on micro-
economic determinants, in part because these have proved to be the most important in 
explaining the broad patterns of technology diffusion, especially within a single country 
or economic system. Looking across countries, other factors such as the level of 
economic development, geography, or culture may play an important role. For example, 
The relatively rapid diffusion of “wireless” or “trackless” technologies such as mobile 
telephony or air travel in developing countries may be largely attributable to their 
relatively late development and to geographical constraints that increase the cost of 
physical networks.  
A second observation is that although many factors affect whether or not new 
technologies are successful, the relative slowness identified by Rosenberg results to a 
great extent from dynamic factors implicit in the process, such as ongoing improvement 
in both old and new technologies. Perhaps the most important such factor is the need to 
develop complementary skills and capital goods, especially in the case of systemic or 
general purpose technologies such as electricity and information technology.  
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